Bush's Preventative War Doctrine
In Humanities Core Lecture Aaron James has been arguing that the Bush Doctrine is one of “preventative,” not “preemptive” war, the former being done when there is no manifestly immanent threat, the latter when there is one; the former being immoral and illegal, while the latter is permissible. I think this is a really useful distinction, but does it help us to determine the morality of Bush’s war in Iraq (and those to come in Syria and Iran)?
It seems the best argument against Bush’s “Preventative War Doctrine” is that it depends on U.S. exceptionalism. To allow everybody to engage in “preventative war” would be to recreate a Hobbesian “state of nature” on the international scale. We would all be compelled to see every inter-national relation as a site of potential conflict. But why should the U.S. be an exception? The only argument that would seem valid is to claim that as the “only remaining superpower” the U.S. has an obligation to act to prevent aggression and lawlessness.
This argument fits if the reason for the invasion of Iraq was to deprive a dangerous dictator of WMD’s, but it doesn’t work if the reason was to “liberate” the Iraqis from an oppressive region. The former rationale fits the U.S.’s (self-appointed!) role as enforcer of the world order, but the latter rationale does not. It represents an attempt to violate the sovereignty of another nation in order to install a regime that more resembles our own.
The truth is, I prefer the “liberation” rationale, even though I think it’s much harder to defend. The truth is, I don’t think we, or anyone else, was particularly threatened by a Saddam Hussein under U.N. sanctions. But I do think people were suffering under his brutality (though they may be suffering more now under our gentelness), and I hate brutality. I hate to see people tortured and brutalized, and no doubt this has something to do with my own experience with this first hand, and no, I don’t mean in Belgrade, I mean in the home I grew up in, so I hate to see people subjected to this kind of oppression. So, in 2003 I was outwardly opposed to the war, but inwardly hoping that it would turn out just the way the neo-cons were predicting--our soldiers greeted with flowers and cheers, elections soon to follow, and teenage girls playing soccer, studying Sylvia Plath, and wearing belly-shirts--but none of that happened.
Yes, I realize that creating democracy in the Middle-East may be an act of self-defense. If Iraq can become a real democracy, and if democracy can spread, then, yes, it might lead to a kindler, gentler world. But can we create that kindler gentler world by killing tens of thousands of people? Can we create that world by imposing our ideology, even if I do think it superior, on others? And even if, ten years from now we look back on the invasion and see it as a significant turning point when this kindler, gentler world was being born, will I be able to say we did the right thing?
Maybe I should, but I probably won’t, but not for the reasons my liberal colleagues give. They are people of principle. They will argue what they are arguing now: the ends don’t justify the means. But I am a not a person of principle; I am a person of raw emotion. The tens (hundreds?) of thousands of people killed will haunt me. Could their deaths have been avoided? That’s what I’ll still be thinking about ten years from now.
Ten years, or so, after the conflict in Bosnia that is what still haunts. So, though I know it’s inconsistent, though I urge restraint/inaction now, I thought we should have intervened then. I should intervened. I should have learned to fire a Kalashnikov and staked my life with the innocents in Sarajevo. But I didn’t. I was in seminary. I was worried about my own wife and children. I did nothing while tens of thousands of Bosnians were slaughtered. Sometimes I can still see their blood on my hands.